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The Limits of Ancillary Jurisdiction
John H. Garvey*

In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger' the Supreme Court
last Term addressed for the first time the permissible scope of ancillary
jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Although the
Court approved using the doctrine in the situations to which it has most
commonly been applied, it disapproved applying the doctrine to a
plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant. This Article suggests that the line drawn by the Court in Kroger is likely to be
particularly mischievous and is inconsistent with the justifications of
fairness, convenience, and economy generally advanced to support the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court's indication that
a clear congressional directive in the basic diversity statute required
3 and Zahn v. InternationalPaper
this outcome adds to Snyder v. Harris
4
Co. another unhappy episode in the shell game whose aim seems to be
reducing the federal caseload by attributing to Congress a nonexistent,
but perhaps desirable, intention.
I.

The Case

James Kroger was electrocuted when a steel crane belonging to
Owen Equipment and Erection Company (Owen) came too close to a
power line that once belonged to the Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD). Kroger's widow, a citizen of Iowa, brought a wrongful death
action against OPPD, a Nebraska corporation, in federal district court
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1970, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1974, Harvard University.
1. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
2. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3523, at 65 (1975).
3. 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969).
4. 414 U.S. 291, 298-300 (1973).
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in Nebraska, claiming negligent construction, maintenance, and operation of the power line. OPPD impleaded Owen for contribution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), 5 asserting that Owen's
negligence was the proximate cause of Kroger's death. Geraldine Kroger then amended her complaint to add a negligence claim against
Owen, stating that Owen was a Nebraska corporation with its principal
place of business in Nebraska. Soon thereafter the court granted
OPPD's motion for summary judgment, leaving Kroger and Owen
alone in the lawsuit.6
The case went to trial in that posture, and on the third day Owen
revealed for the first time that its main office was in Carter Lake, Iowa,
where the accident had occurred. Kroger understandably might have
been confused about Owen's citizenship since Carter Lake lies west of
the Missouri River, the usual boundary between Iowa and Nebraska;
an avulsion apparently had separated Carter Lake from the rest of
Iowa. After a verdict was returned for Kroger, the district court denied
Owen's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.7 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the trial court could properly assert ancillary jurisdiction over Kroger's claim against Owen.8 It found that the sound
exercise of discretion permitted retaining that claim once OPPD was
out of the case, since Owen had neither specifically denied the jurisdictional allegation in Kroger's amended complaint nor moved for dismissal until the close of trial.9
The Supreme Court reversed.' 0 It began by reiterating what no
one denied-that constitutional limits on federal court jurisdiction
might exceed those prescribed by statute, and that while article III
might not preclude entertaining Kroger's claim against Owen, the real
question was whether section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States
Code" (the basic diversity statute) permitted it. The Court recognized
that the requirement of complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants which had been read into that provision did not forbid jurisdiction over all state law claims between nondiverse parties.' 2 In his
5. All subsequent references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
6. Kroger v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., No. 72-0-481 (D. Neb., Aug. 23, 1974) (order granting summary judgment), aff'd, 523 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. No. 72-0-781 (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 1976) (judgment); No. 72-0-781 (D. Neb. Jan. 23, 1976)
(order denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
8. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
9. Id. at 426-27.
10. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) [hereinafter referred to textually as section 1332].
12. 437 U.S. at 375-76.
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opinion for the Court, however, Justice Stewart identified two unifying
principles that he thought fatally distinguished the permissible exceptions from Kroger's suit. First, Kroger's claim against Owen, unlike
OPPD's impleader claim against Owen, was not logically dependent
upon the original complaint: Owen's liability to Kroger was a question
independent of OPPD's liability, whereas Owen's liability to OPPD
was an issue that disappeared from the case once OPPD won summary
judgment.' 3 Second, "ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims
by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another
person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert
them in an ongoing action in a federal court."' 4 Kroger's claim against
Owen, by contrast, was brought by a plaintiff who had chosen a federal
court.
The diversity statute, of course, says nothing about any of these
matters; but the Court found that a proper reading of the statute required its delimitation short of Kroger's claim. For one thing, Congress has repeatedly reenacted or amended the diversity provision, but
has never tampered with the Court's continual insistence on complete
diversity. To permit a plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant would be in substance, if not in form, to allow Kroger
to sue OPPD and Owen as codefendants. More pertinent, when Congress enacted section 1332 as part of the Judicial Code of 1948, it had
before it, and must implicitly have approved, an Advisory Committee
comment on the 1946 amendment to rule 14, which cited the "majority
view" that a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant needed
independent jurisdictional grounds.' 5 Finally, "[tihe policy of the statute"--although the 6Court did not say what that was--"calls for its
'
strict construction."'
Justice White dissented, joined by Justice Brennan. He suggested
that if article III permitted jurisdiction over the original claim, then it
also allowed federal courts to entertain all other claims arising from the
same "nucleus of operative fact."' 7 Of course it would be proper to
read the rather spare language of the statutory jurisdictional grants to
preclude many such claims even though allowing jurisdiction would
serve systemic judicial economy. When a plaintiff has no part in bringing in a new party, however, and no assurance that the defendant can
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 374 & n.16. See 28 U.S.C. app., at 414 (1976).
437 U.S. at 377 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
Id. at 379 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
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or will implead, the court is entitled to consider not only institutional
economy, but also the convenience of and fairness to the plaintiff.
Those three considerations taken together, he reasoned, justified reading section 1332 to permit ancillary jurisdiction."8 The possibility of
collusion with the defendant would not require a contrary result, since
another statutory provision directly addresses that problem. 19
II.

The Functional Limits of Ancillary Jurisdiction

Much of what the Court said in Kroger indicates that, quite apart
from any signals Congress has given about how it wants section 1332 to
be read, there may be sound reasons for refusing to extend ancillary
jurisdiction to plaintiffs' claims against third-party defendants. The
Court's emphasis on the similarity between the Kroger situation and a
straightforward complaint naming a nondiverse codefendant,2 0 and its
insistence that "the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without question in the state courts" 2 1 suggest at least two such reasons.
The first is the currently fashionable objective of reducing the workload of the federal courts even at the cost of pushing more litigation
into state tribunals. The second, supporting the first, is a concern of
federalism: the states' interest in adjudicating state-law questions
should be recognized when federal jurisdiction is not necessary. The
Court recognized more explicitly a third justification for limiting ancillary jurisdiction. The boundaries the Court set to contain ancillary jurisdiction seem designed to accommodate defending and neglected
parties whose interests in convenience and fairness deserve attention
because of their posture in the litigation. But "[a] plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible
claims . . . since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the
state forum and must thus accept its limitations."2 2 Solicitude for the
plaintiff's individual concerns would merely allow her to "defeat the
statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of
suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants. 2 3
18. Id. at 381-82.
19. Id. at 382-83. That statute provides: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976).
20. 437 U.S. at 373-74.
21. Id. at 377 (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir.

1972)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 374.
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This part will suggest that none of these reasons justifies freezing
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction at the point chosen by the Court.

On the contrary, there were very persuasive arguments for accepting
Kroger's claim against Owen-indicating that the foundation for the
Court's result was its assumption that "'Congress in [section 1332] has
. . . expressly or by implication negated' the exercise of jurisdiction
over" plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse third-party defendants.2 4
A.

Limiting the Workload of the Federal Courts

It is tempting to conjecture that the underlying reason for barring
Kroger's claim against Owen was a reluctance to add even one more
item of business to the already mammoth agenda confronting the federal courts. One senses that concern in the Court's statement that Kroger would have found the state courts equal to the task of deciding her
claims against OPPD and Owen simultaneously.2 5 That statement

alone provides little basis for attributing any hdden motive to the
Court. When considered in light of the Chief Justice's annual call for
26
limiting diversity and some types of federal question jurisdiction,
24. Id. at 372 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)).
25. Id. at 375-76. Whether that option was still open to her is a different question, given the
Iowa statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit, at least, thought that time had run out when it
considered the case. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1977).
But see id. at 432 n.42 (Bright, J., dissenting). At any rate, that question is irrelevant if the issue is
one of jurisdiction as the Supreme Court concluded, 437 U.S. at 376-77 n.20, and not of discretion
as Justice White asserted in dissent, id. at 381-84.
26. See Burger, Chief Justice's Yearend Report, 1977, 64 A.B.A.J. 211 (1978) (abolish diversity; require impact statements to accompany legislation; encourage arbitration); Burger, 1977,Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A.J. 504 (1977) (abolish diversity; require impact
statements); Burger, Annual Report on the State ofthe Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443, 444 (1976) (limit
diversity jurisdiction); Burger, The State of the Judiciar-1975,61 A.B.A.J. 439, 441 (1975)
(restructure diversity); Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch-1974,60 A.B.A.J. 1193,
1198 (1974) (applauding development of grievance procedure to keep prisoner complaints out of
the federal courts); Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch-1973,59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126
(1973) (abolish diversity; reduce volume of prisoners' rights cases); Burger, The State of the Federal
Judiciar.--1972,58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1050 (1972) (require court-impact statements to accompany
legislation).
There is good cause for his concern about overloading the federal judiciary-a concern the
significance of which Congress has recognized. See S. 2253, H.R. 9778, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123
CONG. REC. 12340 (1977) (proposing compulsory, nonbinding arbitration in certain civil cases);
H.R. 9622,95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 11222 (1977) (proposing abolition of all diversity
jurisdiction except in cases of statutory interpleader and suits by foreign states or citizens); S. 2094,
H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 9525 (1977) (proposing abolition of diversity
jurisdiction over suits brought by plaintiffs in their own states); DeConcini, New Perspectivesfor
JudicialImprovements:A CongressionalView, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 323 (1978). Many present and
former members of the judiciary have also expressed concern. See Bell, Crisisin the Courts:Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3 (1978); Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal
Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407 (1976); Lasker, The Court Crunc& A View From the Bench, 76
F.R.D. 245 (1978); Phillips, The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the Courts, 31
VAND. L. REV. 17 (1978); Rifkind, Are WeAsking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96 (1976);
Tyler, Congressional and Executive Expansion ofFederalJurisdiction, 71 F.R.D. 229 (1976).
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however, and the conviction prevalent in some quarters that the Court
recently has employed forum-allocation grounds to accomplish objectives beyond mere ascertainment of congressional desires regarding jurisdiction,2 7 the hint in Kroger takes on a bit more force.
All of that notwithstanding, it is difficult to accept that even a
bench wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of reducing the volume of
federal litigation would have chosen this particular place to make a
stand. Unquestionably, a flat ban on plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse third-party defendants will reduce the time a trial court spends on
such cases and will decrease the number of cases filed in federal courts,
to the extent that it encourages joinder in state court rather than piecemeal litigation between state and federal courts. If we assume for the
moment, however, that individual claims to convenience and fairness
are relatively equal in all cases,28 we would naturally expect to find the
boundary of ancillary jurisdiction to be drawn just short of those situations whose exclusion would make a substantial difference in the
amount of federal trial business. It is difficult to make that claim with
any assurance about the situation in Kroger.
First, rule 14(a) allows impleader only of "a person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable to [the third-party plaintiff] for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him."' 29 Thus, in practice a defendant can use the rule only when he has a claim for contribution, indemnity, subrogation, or breach of warranty against a third party.30 It is
therefore difficult to imagine many situations in which a plaintiff
would have a claim against the third-party defendant that would not
require the same proof necessary for the defendant's impleader claim.
Kroger itself provides an example of the typical joint tortfeasor case. 3 '
OPPD's right of contribution from Owen depended on proof that
Owen was jointly liable for James Kroger's death because of negligent
operation of the crane or boom that came too close to the power line.
27. See, e.g., Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the FederalCourts
out ofthe Business ofProtectingFederalRights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977); Neuborne, The
Myth of Pariy,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Sedler, Standingand the Burger Court:AnAnalysis
andSome ProposalsforLegislative Reorm, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (1977); Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: 4 Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
28. A slightly problematic, but not irrational, assumption. See notes 61-74 infra & accompa-

nying text.
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
30. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 518 (2d ed. 1977); 6 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 2, § 1446.

31. Litigation involving joint tortfeasors seems to be the situation in which plaintiffs' claims
are most often made against third-party defendants. See, e.g., Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1970); CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Frankel
v. Back, 37 F.R.D. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
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Owen's liability to Kroger depended on precisely the same theory, and
the same elements of proof would be necessary to establish negligence
in either case. Moreover, the proof of damages that plaintiff must undertake would be the same whether or not she was allowed to assert her
claim against Owen. Construction or other contracts cases in which the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant rests on the assertion
that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement between
the defendant and the impleaded party present analogous common requirements of proof.32
That being so, considerations of judicial economy militate much
more strongly for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in the Kroger
case than over a defendant's impleader claim, 3 a claim to intervene as
of right,34 a compulsory counterclaim 3 5 or a cross-claim 3 6-all cases in
which the Court indicated that section 1332 would not present an obstacle. Each of the latter instances almost requires the addition of at
least one new issue on which otherwise irrelevant evidence must be
introduced. Moreover, impleader and intervention result in the addi-

tion of new parties, with the attendant multiplication of claims, proof,
arguments, and motions.
One obvious difference between Kroger and the cases in which the
Court suggested ancillary jurisdiction was permissible is that only in
the former situation might denial of ancillary jurisdiction remove the
entire case from the federal system. 37 If the Kroger rule does in fact

discourage a sufficient number of plaintiffs from pursuing a federal forum, it actually might have carved the universe of ancillary jurisdiction
at a natural joint. There are, however, cogent reasons to believe that
32. It might sometimes happen that the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant
would extend to matters in which the original defendant had no right of or need for indemnity.
Suppose that in a construction case the plaintiff sues the surety, who impleads the construction
firm for indemnity. The plaintiff might have claims against the contractor that were not covered
by the surety bond-for instance, the soundness of the construction in a case in which the bond
merely covered time of performance. In such a case, however, ancillary jurisdiction might not be
available anyway because the additional claims against the third-party defendant could not be
said to arise from the same "nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966).
33. See, e.g., H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967); Dery v.
Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
34. See, e.g., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 241 (1886); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1113-15 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. See, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
36. See, eg., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d
143 (6th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1966); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v.
United States ex rel Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 229 F.2d 370, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1955).
37. This ignores for the moment the possibility that a defendant will remove on the assumption that he can thereafter acquire ancillary jurisdiction over a counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim. See note 61 infra & accompanying text.
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the ability to assert a claim against a still hypothetical nondiverse thirdparty defendant is not often a sine qua non in a plaintiffs choice of
federal court. First, choosing a federal forum on that assumption is
risky business since there is "absolutely no assurance that the defendant will decide or be able to implead a particular third-party defendant."3 8 In some cases lack of personal jurisdiction will bar impleader.
Perhaps more commonly, the defendant will forego impleader, thinking it will be easier to pin liability on an absent party or fearing that the
impleaded party will have more success establishing the defendant's
liability than would an impecunious plaintiff; the defendant also might
feel that a claim for contribution or indemnity would have more success in a later action before a different court and jury. The defendant
also might conclude that the cost of upsetting business dealings or his
own settlement negotiations with the absent party would exceed any
benefit from possible contribution or indemnity toward paying the
plaintiff's claim.39
In other cases the plaintiff might consciously choose to omit one or
more possible defendants. For example, the plaintiff may have initially
selected the defendant with an eye to reducing expense, facilitating settlement, limiting the other side's peremptory challenges, avoiding jury
confusion, n° or simply maintaining good relations with the omitted
party. On the other hand, it would not be surprising to find a change in
the plaintiff's perception of the case during discovery; it might become
apparent that his complaint against the original defendant has no
chance of success, but that a claim against the impleaded party is quite
strong. Explaining to the plaintiff in that case that he originally should
have sued both parties in state court will provide cold comfort.
Nevertheless, there would probably be cagey plaintiffs who would
gamble successfully on getting their claims against nondiverse third
parties into federal court. The question then is whether it makes sense
to preclude them simply to reduce the federal caseload. 4 ' Of course if
Congress has expressed an intention to exclude such claims, no further
discussion is necessary. But suppose for the moment that it has not.
The most obvious objection to exclusion is that even after Kroger some
plaintiffs will choose federal court and then find themselves wishing

38. 437 U.S. at 383-84 (White, J., dissenting).
39. See Kennedy, Counterclaims,Cross-Claims andImpleader in FederalAviation Litigation,
38 J. AM. LAW & COM. 325, 335-36 (1972).
40. See 2 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 25.01(i)(b) (1963).
41. Of course, there may be other reasons for doing so, which will be considered infra.
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they could assert claims against impleaded parties.42 The marginal cost
of the federal court's deciding those claims is much less than the cost of
later suits in state court. 43 Principles of collateral estoppel would reduce the cost to the states in cases in which the plaintiff won and the
original defendant established a right to contribution or indemnity, or
in which the original defendant successfully established an affirmative

defense.'

But the outcome might just as easily make collateral estop-

pel unavailable;4 5 and in any event the necessity for pleading and proving which issues were litigated in the earlier case would remain.46
To take account of that inefficiency is not to suggest an absence of
reasons why we might want to save the scarce resource of the federal

courts for only the most important or most appropriate cases. It is difficult, however, for the Supreme Court to make that decision concerning
resource allocation, since its judgment in a case like Kroger to keep out

a particular type of claim is made without regard for the possibly lesser
interest in retaining federal jurisdiction over other, better established

issues. 47 By far the more sensible tactic is to leave the matter to Congress, which can simultaneously reexamine the value of every category
of federal litigation. 8
B.

The Federalism Concern
A second argument that might support Kroger's result is in a sense

42. The change of heart might come from those who find after discovery that they have
misjudged the evidence.
43. It makes no difference that it would be impossible to find a principle that would permit
their claims but at the same time keep out the cagey plaintiffs. (And it undoubtedly would be
difficult to do so. As the Court pointed out in Kroger, 365 U.S. at 374-75 n.17, the statutory rule
against collusive joinder does not work.) Some court must decide the claims of these plaintiffs,
and from a system-wide perspective the total cost of having the federal courts do the whole job is
less than that of sending all plaintiff claims against nondiverse third-party defendants to state
courts.
44. In the latter case a defendant might, for instance, establish the plaintiff's contributory
negligence or anticipatory breach of contract. The former third-party defendant, sued by the
plaintiff in a later action, could assert collateral estoppel defensively since the plaintiff had already litigated those issues. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975). But see id. § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). In the former case the plaintiff might be able
to assert collateral estoppel offensively against the former third-party defendant. See id. § 88.
45. This would be the case, for example, when the plaintiff won against the original defendant, who failed to establish a right of indemnity or contribution, or when the plaintiff's claim
against the original defendant rested on grounds unique to that defendant.
46. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876).
47. My personal choice of a starting point for cutting down the caseload, for instance, would
be workmen's compensation cases filed by insurers. Cf. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S.
348, 350-52 (1961) (congressional action to forbid removal of state workmen's compensation cases
to federal court did not also implicitly forbid insurer from filing same case in federal court as
original matter).

48. See Goldberg,TheInfluence ofProceduralRuleson FederalJurisdiction,28 STAN. L. REV.
397, 458 (1976).
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the flip side of the first: if the federal courts have an interest in keeping
out state-law claims between citizens of the same state, so too may the
states have an interest in adjudicating cases involving their own laws
and their own residents.4 9 Unnecessary diversion of such litigation to
federal tribunals may sometimes retard the development of state law,
or at least result in misapplication of standards in cases that are beyond
the state supreme court's power to correct.5 0 This second argument
may also be implicit in the Court's insistence on the preferability of
shunting Kroger's claim against Owen into state court. 51
One short answer to problems of federalism and comity in this
context is that Kroger provides a somewhat ineffective safeguard for
state autonomy. If a statistically significant number of plaintiffs still
choose to split claims against defendants and third-party defendants
between federal and state courts, collateral estoppel will frequently operate to make the federal tribunal's interpretation of state law binding
on the state court.5 2 Even if a more substantial number of cases are
entirely diverted into state courts, however, it is worth asking whether
the putative benefit to the states should be permitted to outweigh the
cost to litigants like Kroger. Is this not a case, like judicial intervention
in questions of national commerce power, in which the Court is on
weak ground in asserting the interests of the states in light of the states'
ability to protect themselves by pushing for congressional limitations
on jurisdiction whenever they feel that restriction is desirable?53
C. Fairnessto the Foxy Plaintiff
A third justification for the result in Kroger-andone that played
a crucial role in the Court's resolution of the issue-is that any other
result would permit cunning plaintiffs to do indirectly what they could
not do directly: join diverse and nondiverse defendants in federal
court.54 The Court recognized that whenever ancillary jurisdiction is
exercised it allows some party to do indirectly what he could not do as
an original matter. But the Court suggested that two preconditions for
this result did not exist in Kroger. First, unlike the claim against Owen,
the "relation [of an ancillary claim] to the original complaint is [one of]
49. See ALL, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
99-100 (1969).
50. Id But see Note, The Effect of Diversity Jurisdictionon State Litigation, 40 IND. L.J. 566
(1965).
51. 437 U.S. at 376.
52. See notes 44-46 supra & accompanying text.
53. See Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards f Federalis&n The Role ofthe States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954).
54. See 437 U.S. at 374-75.
COURTS
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not mere factual similarity but logical dependence. '55 Second, "ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled
into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be
unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a
irretrievably lost
56
court."
federal
Before examining these criteria one should clarify the type of
plaintiff behavior at issue. The Court was not worried about collusion
between plaintiff and the original defendant. 7 Even the dissenters
would have blocked that sort of cunning, and another statutory provision prohibits it. 8 Furthermore, as pointed out above,5 9 there might be
perfectly legitimate concerns that would lead a plaintiff to omit one or
more defendants in the original complaint even in state court. The
same plaintiff, after a closer look at the case in the course of pleading
and discovery and, again, for reasons based only on the merits or on
trial strategy, might decide to join an omitted defendant. Thus a rule
forbidding any plaintiff to assert a claim against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant is unnecessary to catch the really reprehensible characters and instead works to the disadvantage of both innocent and sly
parties.
This qualification rather naturally leads to discussion of the
Court's second precondition; thus, it may be useful to take them up in
reverse order. The second criterion, again, is that to invoke ancillary
jurisdiction a party has to be in a defensive posture (for example, a
defendant asking to counterclaim, cross-claim, or implead) or else left
out of the litigation altogether (and seeking to intervene). The idea is
that we should be more concerned about fairness to those who can only
react to the inconvenience of litigation initiated by another person than
about helping a plaintiff who could have helped himself by beginning
in a forum in which he could join all his claims.
The rule seems straightforward enough, but of course it is not. To
begin with the most obvious problem, suppose that Kroger had filed
her action in Iowa state court, that OPPD had removed and impleaded
Owen, and that Kroger had then asserted her claim against Owen.
Fairness to her would certainly demand taking ancillary jurisdiction
under those circumstances, and yet she is by no stretch of the imagina55. Id. at 376.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 374 n.17.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976). See 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 14.27[1], at 14-571 (2d ed.
1978); 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 2, § 1444, at 231-32; Note, Rule 14
Claimsand.4ncillaryJurisdiction,57 VA. L. REv. 265, 274-75 (1971).
59. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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tion a "defending party."6 Perhaps the solution is to say that she was
"haled into Vederal] court against [her] will" 6 ' and for that reason deserves the benefit of ancillary jurisdiction. That resolution, however,
merely shifts the issue: since OPPD chose the federal court, why should
it have the right to implead Owen, an entity incorporated in Nebraska
and thus nondiverse with OPPD? More generally, why permit ancillary jurisdiction over any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim brought by a removing defendant with no independent basis for
jurisdiction? The answer is clear: at least as long as we have diversity
jurisdiction, the defendant has a right to a federal determination of the
plaintiff's claim against him, which he may be forced to forego if we
penalize removal by refusing ancillary jurisdiction over connected
claims. However, precisely the same thing may be said of Kroger's
claim against OPPD. In the future, plaintiffs who can get into federal
court but fear they may change their minds about omitted nondiverse
third parties will be encouraged by Kroger to forego the luxury of diversity jurisdiction.
Nor does removal present the only question about the soundness
of the Kroger rule. In Phelps v. Oaks12-the case cited by the Kroger
Court as authority for the permissibility of ancillary jurisdiction over
nondiverse intervenors-plaintiffs, citizens of Pennsylvania, had
brought an action of ejectment in federal court against Oaks, a citizen
of Missouri.6 3 Oaks, however, was a tenant of John and Maria
Zeidler-both of Pennsylvania-and had been paying them the rent
the plaintiffs sought. Today Oaks normally would implead the
Zeidlers,64 and plaintiffs then might wish to settle the entire question
by asserting their claims against the landlords. Instead, the Zeidlers
intervened 65 as defendants to protect their own claim to title, and the
Court permitted the action to proceed with Pennsylvanians on both
sides. If permitting plaintiffs to claim against intervening defendants
differs from allowing them to claim against impleaded defendants on
these facts, that difference eludes me. A plaintiff might gamble on
joining the omitted party either way, and whether he would win or lose
after Kroger would depend simply on whether the defendant or the
60. 437 U.S. at 376.
61. Id.
62. 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
63. Actually the action was begun in Missouri state court and removed by plaintiffs pursuant
to the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 135, § 2, 18 Stat. 470. 117 U.S. at 236.
64. The Court acknowledged the possibility of Oaks vouching for his landlords. 117 U.S. at
239-40.
65. The Zeidlers intervened pursuant to Missouri procedure, followed in Missouri federal
court pursuant to the Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872). 117 U.S. at 238-39.
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omitted party moved first.6 6
Perhaps the idea is that when the omitted party intervenes there is
a justifiable concern with fairness to him, since he rather than the
plaintiff has asked that the issues between them be determined. The
best analogy from this perspective is between the intervening defendant

and the impleaded party who seeks to assert a claim against the plaintiff.6 7 However, permitting jurisdiction over a particular issue to turn
on who requests it presents a couple of problems. One that arises when
the intervenor or third-party defendant merely inverts the plaintiff's
claim in a request for declaratory relief is the incongruity with the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule, which permits jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions only if it also would have existed in the correlative coercive action with the parties reversed.6 8 A more serious
objection, however, is the difficulty of maintaining that the defensive
(or omitted) party's convenience is served when he asks for relief
against the plaintiff, but not when the plaintiff asks for relief against
him. Suppose that in the Kroger case OPPD's summary judgment motion had been denied, and OPPD had gone to trial asserting its contribution claim against Owen. In that event Owen might have found it
much more convenient to fight it out with Kroger in the federal action
rather than face the possibility of a later state court suit on the same
facts. Yet it is unlikely that Owen could force Kroger's hand by requesting a declaratory judgment of nonliability given the often expressed judicial preference for protecting the plaintiff's right to choose
the time, place, and sequence for asserting personal injury claims.6 9
The purpose of this brief discussion concerning removal and intervention is to suggest that the Court erred in using initiative in the
66. Precisely the same problem would arise under current practices in any case in which the
omitted party has a right to intervene under rule 24(a), save perhaps when he would have been an
indispensable party under rule 19(b). See Insurance Co. of Am. v. Blindauers Sheet Metal &
Heating Co., 61 F.R.D. 323 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (intervenor an indispensable party); 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PR~cTIcE 124.18131 (2d ed. 1978); 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
2, § 1917; Baker, To ward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PiTr.
L. REv. 759, 777-78 (1972); Goldberg, supra note 48, at 421-24.
67. Cf. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970)
(permitting the third party's claim against the plaintiff). The Fifth Circuit also adopted the Kroger rule for a plaintiff's claims against a third-party defendant. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d
636 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Trautman, Federal
Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REv. 445 (1954). The incongruity is
probably not fatal, since that doctrine seems restricted to cases in which the parties seek federal
question jurisdiction as an original matter rather than merely to tack on to an action already
legitimately lodged in federal court. It does, however, illustrate a bias toward parity in the right to
invoke federal jurisdiction.
69. See Cunningham Bros. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 959 (1969);
10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 2, § 2765.
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choice of forum to identify a right to ancillary jurisdiction. Up to now
the analysis has suggested that the test has three faults: it is likely to
create considerable confusion in cases in which the party who started
the litigation did not choose the federal forum; it discourages some
bona fide diversity plaintiffs from choosing federal court; and it overlooks the fairness claims of others for whom the party seeking ancillary
jurisdiction may act as proxy. Still a fourth problem arises if we consider some difficult problems of foreseeability that will inevitably occur. Suppose a three-car accident occurs involving P, T, and D. If P
and 7' are citizens of the same state and join as plaintiffs and if P tries
to cross-claim against Tat the outset, it seems as though the "initiative
70
in choice of forum" test would preclude ancillary jurisdiction. Suppose, though, that P seeks to assert a contribution claim against 7 only
after D has asserted a compulsory counterclaim, and (1) Tjoins P as
an original plaintiff, or (2) 7 is impleaded by P under rule 14(b), or (3)
7is brought in under rule 13(h) as an additional party to D's counterclaim.7 1 In each instance P only half fits Kroger's description of a "defending party haled into court against his will." 72 P has chosen the
federal court and could as surely predict D's counterclaim as Kroger
could have predicted OPPD's impleader of Owen. Moreover, P could
be assured of resolving all claims arising from the accident by joining 7
as a plaintiff or suing him as a codefendant in state court.
Kroger seems to suggest that a party's right to have the court be
fair to him in granting ancillary jurisdiction depends on whether he
took the initiative in choosing federal court, since he might have
avoided jurisdictional difficulties by choosing a state forum. As the
foregoing example indicates, however, the plaintiff's ability to avoid
trouble will depend on how foreseeable that trouble is; and the less
certain that prediction is, the more the plaintiff is entitled to ancillary
jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that he chose the court. If in the
example above D's counterclaim had been permissive, it seems that
even under the strictest application of the Kroger rule P would be allowed ancillary jurisdiction over his claim against 7'. The point is that
no test based solely upon party structure or initiative in the choice of
70. There has been little careful analysis of cross-claims between plaintiffs. Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1958), a case similar to that hypothesized in text, suggests--contrary to
the explicit language of the rule--that rule 13(g) does not permit a plaintiff to cross-claim unless
the defendant has first filed a counterclaim. Danner also suggests, though, that the case is not
covered by ancillary jurisdiction. See also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinderof Claims
in the FederalCourts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 37 (1964).
71. See Southwest Lime Co. v. Lindley, 12 F.R.D. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
72. 437 U.S. at 376.
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forum will correspond well with the concerns of fairness that underlie
ancillary jurisdiction. By far the better approach is that taken by the
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs73-to recognize the
possibility of ancillary jurisdiction over all claims arising from the
same transaction and to leave the trial judge with discretion to determine the issues of fairness and economy.7 4
The other justification Justice Stewart offered for refusing to sanction the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in Kroger-that Kroger's
claim against Owen was not "logically dependent" on, but only factually similar to, her claim against OPPD-is equally troublesome. It is
difficult to say whether "logical dependence" is a sine qua non for ancillary jurisdiction in every case, since it is unclear what the Court
meant by the term. The most obvious interpretation is certainly not the
one the Court intended:
[T]he nonfederal claim in this case was simply not ancillary to
the federal one in the same sense that, for example, the impleader
by a defendant of a third-party defendant always is. A thirdparty complaint depends at least in part upon the resolution of
the primary lawsuit. . . . Its relation to the original complaint is
thus not mere factual similarity but logical dependence. Cf.
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 [1926].
The respondent's claim against the petitioner, however, was entirely separate from her original claim against OPPD, since the
petitioner's liability to her depended not at all upon whether or
not OPPD was also liable.75
It is true that a third-party complaint is parasitic on the original
73. 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
74. It is perhaps worthwhile to examine briefly a few other problems that may arise in light
of Kroger. I presume that when federal jurisdiction over the main claim is exclusive, see, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1976) (United States as defendant), the Court would look more kindly on plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse third-party defendants, since it would be unfair to treat the plaintiff's exclusive option of federal court as an "initiative in the choice of forum." But see Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
The Court attempts to leave open the question of whether Kroger will apply to cases in which
there is concurrent federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff's original claim: "[N]either the
convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of the same
State in a diversity case." 437 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). But it is hard to see why there should
be any doubt about the matter. Aldinger, despite the fact that it arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), seems to preclude joinder of nondiverse third parties as
pendent codefendants in virtually all federal question cases. See Comment, Aldinger v. Howard
andPendentJurisdiction,77 COLUM. L. REv. 127 (1977). That being so, there seems little reason
after Kroger to allow a plaintiff with the initiative in the choice of forum to achieve the same
result when such a party is brought in as a third-party defendant. True, forcing those plaintiffs
into state court requires them to abandon the right to a federal application of federal law rather
than the luxury of diversity jurisdiction. But as long as both rights are on the statute books, there
is no justification for treating one less cavalierly than the other.

75. 437 U.S. at 376.
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complaint in a unique way, since rule 14(a) permits impleader only
when the defendant can push the plaintiff's claim off on the third
party. That kind of logical dependence, however, seldom characterizes
recognized
counterclaims, cross-claims, or intervention, and the Court
76
the legitimacy of ancillary jurisdiction in those cases.
The citation of Moore77 (a case concerning not impleader but a
compulsory counterclaim) in the passage quoted above suggests a second possible interpretation of the phrase "[dependence] upon the resolution of the primary lawsuit." Plaintiff in Moore sued the New York
Cotton Exchange for violating the Sherman Act by its monopoly on
cotton quotations, which the Exchange refused to furnish to the plaintiff. The Exchange counterclaimed under state law for injunctive relief,
alleging that plaintiff was stealing the quotations anyway and distributing them to bucket shops. Because there was no diversity,78 the Court
had to determine whether relief might be granted on the counterclaim
after dismissing the claim stated in Moore's bill. The Court resolved
the issue by stating that ancillary jurisdiction would exist if the counterclaim met the first requirement of old Equity Rule 30-that is, if 7it9
"[arose] out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit."
It further concluded that "transaction" would encompass occurrences
that had a "logical relationship"" and that here "[s]o close is the connection between the case sought to be stated in the bill and that set up
in the counterclaim, that it only needs the failure of the former to establish a foundation for the latter."8 1
Even Moore's statement of the test is ambiguous, but at least it
seems to indicate that ancillary jurisdiction exists when a determination
of the main claim-whatever the result-will necessarily affect the determination of the dependent claim. In Moore, for example, resolving
the antitrust claim in plaintiff's favor could have been fatal to the Exchange's request for injunctive relief 82 (though not, perhaps, to a claim
for damages); and a decision that the Exchange had a right to withhold
the quotations was a necessary precondition of its right to prevent their
appropriation. As the Court pointed out in Kroger, however, a judgment that OPPD was or was not negligent had no effect on Owen's
76. Id.
77. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
78. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 291 F. 681, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), af/d, 270 U.S.
593 (1926).
79. 270 U.S. at 609.
80. Id. at 610.
81. Id.
82. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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liability. 83
If the above interpretation of Moore is what the Court meant in
Kroger by "logical dependence," it too does not square well with the
tacit approval of ancillary jurisdiction in other types of cases. Take by
way of illustration LASA PerL'ZndustriaDel Marmo Societa PerAzioni
v. Alexander,s4 a case cited by the Court as an example of an ancillary
cross-claim. Southern, the main contractor to build a city hall in Memphis, subcontracted with Alexander to put on the marble. Alexander in
turn subcontracted with LASA to furnish the marble. LASA sued Alexander, Southern, and others for the balance due on the marble, and
Alexander cross-claimed against Southern for, among other things, the
balance due on its subcontract, wrongful termination, and damage to
business reputation. Although the Sixth Circuit held that the "logical
relationship" between the main claim and the cross-claims justified
taking ancillary jurisdiction,8 5 it is obvious that LASA's success or failure might have no effect whatsoever on Alexander's cross-claims. Not
only were the latter based on a different subcontract, but proof of them
depended on allegations that Southern had, for instance, demanded installation in inclement weather and had failed to prepare properly the
concrete base to which the marble was to be affixed.
Not only is it true that cross-claims, counterclaims, or intervention
might not entail the kind of "logical dependence" that the Moore Court
seemed to have contemplated, but it is also easy to imagine plaintiffs'
claims against third-party defendants that would. In litigation involving alternative liability in which the burden of proof on the issue of
causation is imposed on the defending parties86 or in cases in which the
burden of proof on apportionment of damages is imposed on those liable,8 7 the decision on the main claim would automatically resolve the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant.
The inevitable conclusion is that if the Court intended "logical dependence" to be an independent condition for ancillary jurisdiction
83. A decision on the main claim could,of course, resolve the claim against Owen too -as it
would if the decision found the deceased to have been contributorily negligent. But that is not a

question that must necessarily have arisen, and a determination of the contributory negligence
issue in Kroger's favor would not be binding on Owen anyway.
84. 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969).
85. Id. at 147.
86. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (shot fired by one of two
defendants struck plaintiff).
87. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951) (pollution of
irrigation waters); Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950) (aggravation
of fire injuries resulting from failure to provide exit doors); De Corsey v. Purex Corp., 92 Cal.
App. 2d 669, 207 P.2d 616 (1949) (aggravation of injuries from exploding bottle because of compound's deterioration).
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rather than simply a handy test for identifying cases that satisfy existing
conditions, it was simply wrong. Although the phrase "logical relation" does have a respectable pedigree among civil procedure commentators, oddly enough the meaning most frequently attached to it in that
context is the one meaning that the Court explicitly repudiated. Prior
to Kroger the term had been employed to identify situations in which a
counterclaim8 8 or a cross-claim 89 arose out of the "transaction or occurrence" that was the subject matter of the original action or a properly
asserted counterclaim. Indeed, the Moore Court used the phrase to define "transaction" for purposes of counterclaims under Equity Rule 30.
For what it is worth, rule 14(a) says that "[t]he plaintiff may assert any
claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the
° it seems entirely consistent to use the "logical
third-party plaintiff ";9
relation" test in its nonjurisdictional sense to identify cases meeting
that description. It is no accident, however, that ancillary jurisdiction
extends across the entire range of cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims, since the "transaction or occurrence" requirement aims at
the same elements of judicial economy, party convenience, and fairness
that justify ancillary jurisdiction. If that is so, it seems that the most
common use of the phrase "logical relation" provides an argument for,
rather than against, taking jurisdiction over Kroger's claim against
Owen.
III.

Statutory Interpretation

Up to this point I have endeavored to establish that if there is a
reason that explains the outcome in Kroger, it can only be the Court's
conviction that "'Congress . . .expressly or by implication negated'
the exercise of jurisdiction over [Kroger's] claim."'" The Court found
evidence of that negation in two places. First was Congress' repeated
reenactment of the basic diversity statute in apparent awareness of the
judicial insistence on complete diversity and, in 1948, in apparent approval of an Advisory Committee comment casting aspersions on
claims like Kroger's. Second was the idea that "[t]he policy of the statute calls for its strict construction." 92 Given the rather tenuous inferences the Court drew from equally nebulous congressional indications
88.
n.45.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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See cases cited in 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 2, § 1410, at 42
See id. § 1432, at 17 n.18.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)).
437 U.S. at 377 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
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9 3 and Zahn v. Inconcerning jurisdictional amount in Snyder v. Harris
ternationalPaper Co.," it should not be surprising that this evidence
was sufficient to settle the question. But at the risk of beating a dead
horse, the matter merits close examination to see just how unprincipled
the Court's conclusion was.

A.

The Reenactment Thesis

Although the Kroger Court speaks of repeated reenactments of the
diversity statute,9 5 it simplifies analysis to note that the enactments in
question are the Judicial Code of 194896 and the amendatory Act of
1958. 97 For all practical purposes, the device of impleader did not exist
in the federal courts prior to 1938,98 and congressional enactments
before that time could hardly have expressed or implied anything concerning the issue before the Court in Kroger. Furthermore, what other
amendments there have been to section 1332 since the adoption of the
original rule 14 have dealt with matters too far removed from the question presented in Kroger to be considered relevant. 99
93. 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969). See Goldberg, supra note 48, at 450-54; Strausberg, Class
Actions andJurisdictionalAmount:Access to a FederalForum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis,
22 AM. U.L. REV.79, 88-89 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 62, 204
(1969); Note, UnnamedPlaintifsin FederalClassActions: Zahn v. International Paper Co. Further
Restricts theAvailabilityof the Class Suit, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 190, 197-98 (1974); Comment, Seeking
a FederalForum in Diversity ClassActions: Recent Developments in Subject MatterJurisdiction, 19
S.D.L. REV. 333, 342 (1974).
94. 414 U.S. 291, 298-300 (1973). See Goldberg, supra note 48, at 450-53; Theis, Zahn v.
International Paper Co.: The Non-Aggregation Rule in JurisdictionalAmountCases, 35 LA. L. REV.
89, 95 (1974).
95. 437 U.S. at 373.
96. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869 (current version codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2906 (1976)).
97. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 74 Stat. 415 (codified in relevant part at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)).
98. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that year made third party practice generally available in all federal courts. Until then federal procedure was governed by the
Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), which tracked state procedures. Only a half
dozen states allowed impleader, and three of them passed their impleader statutes not long before
the adoption of the Federal Rules. See Bennett, Bringing in Third Partiesby the Defendant, 19
MINN. L. REV. 163 (1935); Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement ofDefendants' Rights Against Third
Parties,33 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1933); Willis, Five Years ofFederalThird-PartyPractice,29 VA.
L. REV. 981 (1943). There was a provision for third party practice in admiralty in the federal
courts dating back to 1883. See The Hudson, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); Sup. Ct. Adm. R. 59, 112
U.S. 743 (1884) (promulgated in 1883). In 1921 rule 56 of the Supreme Court Rules in Admiralty
took the place of rule 59 (the 1883 rule), and permitted impleader both when the third party was
directly answerable to the libellant, and when the only claim against the third party was a claim
over by the respondent. 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 349 (6th ed. 1940); Cohen, supra, at 1168.
In either case, however, the seventh amendment was understood to permit only claims within the
maritime jurisdiction to be asserted against the impleaded party, Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd
Braziliero, 283 F. 62, 74 (2d Cir. 1922); Cohen, supra, at 1169-so no problem of ancillary jurisdiction could have arisen.
99. Besides the Judicial Code of 1948 and the 1958 amendments, the following amendments
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The 1948 codification followed by two years an amendment to rule
14 that made liability over to the defendant a precondition of impleader. The Advisory Committee comment on that amendment noted
that it was "the majority view" that plaintiffs' claims against thirdparty defendants would require independent jurisdictional grounds.100
From these facts the Kroger Court concluded that "[t]he subsequent
reenactment without relevant change of the diversity statute may thus
be seen as evidence of congressional approval of that 'majority

view. "101
Neither the Committee reports 02 nor the scanty House 10 3 and
Senate' 4 debates on the bill so much as mention ancillary jurisdiction,
let alone the problem considered by the Advisory Committee comment.
The Committee hearings 10 5 are equally silent. Indeed, the only relevant impression that emerges from examination of the legislative history is an acute awareness of the limited role a codification performs.
The Senate report emphasized that "great care has been exercised to
make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval."' 1 6 It recommended deletion of the

only provision that did occasion disagreement-a proposal to transfer
provisions regarding the Tax Court from the Internal Revenue Code to
the Judicial Code--"[s]ince every effort has been made to avoid controversial matters in this revision."'0 7 The Senate Hearings reiterate
the desire to avoid all controversy. 0 8 Moreover, Representative Devitt
have been enacted: Act of Apr. 20, 1940, Pub. L. No. 463, 54 Stat. 143; Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-439,78 Stat. 445; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 3, 90
Stat. 2891. The first extended diversity jurisdiction to citizens of the District of Columbia and the
territories; the second amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to provide that in any direct action against an
insurance company the insurer should be considered a citizen of the same state as the insured.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act deleted the references to "foreign states" found in
paragraphs (2) and (3) (delegating treatment of jurisdiction in actions against foreign, states to the
new 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976)), and also added a new paragraph (4) to provide for diversity jurisdiction in suits brought by foreign states as plaintiffs.
100. 28 U.S.C. app., at 414 (1976).
101. 437 U.S. at 374 n.16.
102. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., IstSess.
(1947).
103. 94 CONG. REc. 8498-501 (1948); 93 CONG. REc. 5049-50, 8384-92 (1947).
104. 94 CONG. REC. 7927-30 (1948).
105. JudicialCode and Judiciary:Hearingson H.A 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
the Judiciaryofthe UnitedStates Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on H.R.3214]. Cf.Revision 0/Ties 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearingson H.. 1600
andH A 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Comm on the Judiciaryofthe House of Representatives, 80th Cong., IstSess. (1947) (revision makes no basic changes in diversity jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R 1600 and HJ.. 2055].
106. S. REP. No. 1559, supra note 102, at 2.
107. -d.
108. Hearingson H.A 3214,supra note 105, at 15 (remarks of Rep. Reed), 17 (remarks of Rep.
Devitt), 22 (remarks of Judge Mars). Cf.Hearingson H.R.1600 andH. 2055, supranote 105, at
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stated that the House Judiciary Committee had "found it humanly impossible to make a section-by-section detailed examination of the many
provisions of the bill," and had relied in large measure on the work of
the West Publishing Company, the Edward Thompson Company, and
the various advisory committees that assisted them in the compilation.' 09

This paucity of legislative history suggests that it is fanciful to infer
from the fact of reenactment in code form that Congress meant to
adopt one position or another on any matter that was at all in dispute.I 0 Whatever may be the implications of reenactment in the ordinary case of an individual statute,"' the political ambiance that
surrounds the codification process leaves little opportunity for substantive changes not necessary to resolve contradictions within the corpus
being clarified." 2 Because of the very magnitude of the task and because the enterprise entails few political rewards," 13 the only way a
codification can be successfully accomplished is by avoiding any hint
of partisan controversy
and by making no changes without virtually
4

unanimous support."

6, 11 (remarks of Rep. Keogh) (Committee on Revision of the Laws sought to avoid controversy
"as far as possible").
109. Hearingson H.A 3214, supra note 105, at 16-17. See also Hearingson H. 1600 and
H..R. 2055,supra note 105, at 3 (remarks of Rep. Devitt).
110. Cf. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 & n.10 (1941) (reenactment of
law in code form does not warrant assumption that unsettled doctrine under law has been given
legislative confirmation).
Ill. See E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 243 (1940); R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 130-31 (1975); 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973).
112. House Report No. 308 stated that "[rlevision, as distinguished from codification, required
the substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, repeal of
superseded sections, and consolidation of related provisions." H. REP. No. 308, supra note 102, at
2. See Note, Legislative Adoption of PriorJudicialConstruction:The Girouard Caseand the Reenactment Rule, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (1946).
113. See 93 CONG. REC. 8385 (1948) (remarks of Rep. Robsion) ("This bill. . . will mean
little politically to anyone who gave it his time and thought.")
114. See id. ("It can be said truthfully that this bill is not a partisan bill in any respect....
[T]here has been absolutely no opposition whatever to this codification as a whole."); H. HART &
A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

1402 (1958); P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 512 (1965).
This suggestion in general terms is borne out more specifically in those passages in the legislative history of the codification that refer to diversity jurisdiction. In commenting on the predecessor of H.R. 3214 -H.R. 2055-Professor J. William Moore stated that "the revision ... might
have involved far-reaching change. For example, diversity jurisdiction might have been eliminated, as many have advocated. But the revision has made no basic changes." Hearingson H.A
1600 and H.R. 2055, supra note 105, at 27. The House Report on H.R. 3214, the bill that ultimately was enacted, stated that "[s]ome minor changes of existing law were necessary in revising
provisions relating to jurisdiction of district courts. These are noted in the reviser's notes under
sections 1332 [etc.]." H. REP. No. 308, supra note 102, at 6. The reviser's notes in relevant part
speak only of clarifications regarding suits in which a citizen of a territory or the District of Co-
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The second difficulty with the assumption that Congress adopted
the "majority view" announced by the Advisory Committee arises from
the source of the interpretation. This is not to say that the Committee's
thoughts on the question were not well informed" 5 or inherently respectable. That it was the Advisory Committee, however, and not the
Supreme Court who was interpreting the jurisdictional statutes casts
doubt on Kroger's inference for two reasons. First, it is less likely that
the Advisory Committee's thoughts on the matter would have come to
the attention of Congress. An intent to resolve by the codification existing disagreement about applying section 1332 in impleader cases is
far less easily presumed when the controversy has not received sufficient notoriety to reach the attention of the court of last resort. 6 (The
same also may be said of the cases to which the Advisory Committee
referred.) Second, that the Committee's statement-if it is read as approval of the "majority view"-was not binding in any fashion means
that Congress could not, consistently with the constitutionally imposed
requirements of clear statement, 1 7 adopt it without explicitly saying so.
lumbia is a party, and of the substitution of the phrase "all civil actions" for the words "all suits of
a civil nature, at common law or in equity" to conform to FED. R. Civ. P. 2. Id., app., at A 115-16.
115. At the time the statement was made in 1946, the weight of authority was clearly against
the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. See Friend v. Middle Atd. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946); Hull v. United States Rubber Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv. 14a.62,
Case 3 (E.D. Mich. 1945); Saunders v. B&O R.R., 63 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. W. Va. 1945); Banks v.
Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 7 Fed. R. Serv. 14a.l 1, Case 2 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Thompson v.
Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,319 U.S. 741
(1943); Johnson v. G.J. Sherrard Co., 2 F.R.D. 164 (D. Mass. 1941); Herrington v. Jones, 2 F.R.D.
108 (E.D. La. 1941); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
But it was by no means unanimous. See Sklar v. Hayes, I F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941). Cf. Malkin
v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941) (when original defendants could not enforce
contribution against third-party defendant unless plaintiff obtained joint judgment against original and third-party defendants, motion to rescind order for third-party complaint would be
granted unless plaintiff amended complaint to include nondiverse third-party defendant); Crum v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 29 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. W. Va. 1939) (an independent basis ofjurisdiction is not necessary to support a third-party proceeding); Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F.
Supp. 67 (D.N.J. 1939). See also Kravas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Pa.
1939); Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Holtzoff, Some Problems Under
Federal7hird-Party Practice,3 LA. L. REv. 408, 415 (1941); 24 MINN. L. REv. 126 (1939).
116. See E. CRAWFORD, supra note I 11, § 233. In fact, the only reference to the Federal Rules
themselves in the Senate Report is a statement that "no provisions of the existing Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. . . are amended or otherwise affected by this bill." S. REP. No. 1559, supranote
102, at 8. The House Report does state that the source material for the codification included,
along with voluminous other material, "Notes on the Rules of Civil Procedure ... promulgated
by the Supreme Court." H. REP. No. 308, supra note 102, at 1. From all that appears, however,
the rules and any commentary considered were used simply to excise statutory provisions made
obsolete by the rules, such as the provision in 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940 ed.) which read "all suits of
a civil nature, at common law or in equity." See Hearingson H. 1600 andH. 2055, supranote
105, at 19 (remarks of Judge Mars), 27 (remarks of Prof. Moore), 31 (letter from Floyd E. Thompson to John M. Robsion); Maris, New FederalJudicialCode Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable Gain, 34 A.B.A.J. 863 (1948).
117. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 114, at 1413.
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The reason should be obvious. Statements made by courts are ranked
by authoritativeness according to the position that a judge occupies
within the judicial system-with the Supreme Court's statements concerning the Federal Rules, for example, universally binding the federal
courts. Outside the structure of binding judicial or administrative interpretations, however, it becomes impossible to rank arguments by
any criteria other than force of logic and consistency with precedent.
To the extent that application of those criteria is uncertain, it is impossible to say with assurance which among conflicting positions Congress
may have had in mind unless it has made its views explicit. For the
Kroger Court to presume that Congress came to the conclusion that the
Court found most persuasive is merely to substitute judicial for legislative judgment.
Still a third difficulty with the Court's assumption that Congress
adopted the Advisory Committee's view arises from the text of section
1332 itself. The phrase "civil actions where the matter in controversy
. . . is between. . . citizens of different States" has never been unambiguous in its application to multiple party or multiple claim cases." 8
From the outset, the provision has occasioned problems in joinder as
an original matter, 9 class actions, 120 shareholder derivative actions, 121
realignment of parties, 122 nominal parties, 123 fiduciaries, 2 4 intervention,12 5 impleader, 126 counterclaims, 2 7 cross-claims,1 28 and substitution
of parties' 2 9 -to mention a few. 130 Given that breadth of generality,
even congressional intention to approve the Advisory Committee's
comment need not freeze the law forever into that mold. It might mean
simply that the "majority view" of the situation was one authorized by
the statute, although there might be others. This only says that the expansive terms in which the law has been drawn were chosen to give the
118. Rut see 437 U.S. at 373.
119. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
120. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
121. See, e.g., Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
122. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
123. See, e.g., Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
124. See, e.g., MeSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
125. See, e.g., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
126. See, e.g., Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
127. See, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
128. See, e.g., Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966).
129. See, e.g., Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 112 (1894).
130. Other difficulties not involving multiple parties or claims have included the definition of
corporate citizenship, as in Louisville, C.&C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844), and
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), and the time for determining
diversity, as in Louisville, N.A.&C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552 (1899).
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courts power to make law on an intermediate plane of generality,13 1 3a2
methodology frequently employed outside the jurisdictional context. 1
That the Constitution gives Congress and not the courts the power
to establish "inferior Courts"133-and by inference to define their jurisdiction- does not mean that Congress' inferred power to define jurisdiction precludes the courts' expansive interpretation of congressional

enactments that purport to exercise that power. The Constitution also
gives Congress, and not the courts, power to regulate commerce among

the several states, 34 and yet the Sherman Act passed pursuant to that
provision delegates far more lawmaking power to the courts than is
contended for here. 135 In short, a frank awareness of the generality of
section 1332 entails a recognition that in applying it the courts will have
to engage in some interpolation, not merely an exercise in cognition of
what Congress meant.' 36 If that is so, then the courts would remain
free to change their minds about interstitial decisions- even ones that
Congress liked-until the delegating law is replaced by one using more

specific terms in which Congress reasserts its decisionmaking primacy.
None of these arguments is strictly applicable to the Court's contention that more specific reenactments of section 1332 that "[left] intact [the] rule of complete diversity" evidence a congressional intent to
preclude ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse
third-party defendants. 37 To the extent that argument makes any
sense, it most directly refers to the 1958 Act, the only one since the
enactment of the Federal Rules that has affected in a general way the
terms "matter in controversy" and "citizens of different States."' 138 The
See R. DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 182.
132. See e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Management Relations Act); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
133. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
135. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
136. I here adopt terms used by Professor Dickerson, supra note 11, at 13-32. A related claim
in favor of judicial tinkering with a basic jurisdictional scheme is made in Goldberg, supra note
48, at 431-41. Professor Shapiro has recently suggested that the more basic controversy over the
propriety of diversity jurisdiction itself could be resolved by giving each federal court power to
retain, limit, or abolish diversity jurisdiction within its borders. Shapiro, FederalDiversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 340 (1977).
137. 437 U.S. at 373.
138. The Act raised the requisite amount in controversy from $3000 to $10,000 and made any
corporation for purposes of both original and removal jurisdiction a citizen of the state where it
had its principal place of business as well as of the state where it was incorporated. Act of June 25,
1948, Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869. The 1964 Act simply qualified the definition of corporate
citizenship still further in direct action suits against insurance companies. Act of Aug. 14, 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-439, 78 Stat. 445. The 1940 Act extended diversity jurisdiction by adding after the
phrase "between citizens of different States" the clause "or citizens of the District of Columbia,
the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or Territory." Act of Apr. 20, 1940, Pub. L. No.
463, 54 Stat. 143.
131.
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Court's position seems not to be that by reenacting section 1332 Congress froze the case law refusing ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
claims. Rather it is this: Congress has reaffirmed the ancient conclusion'39 that "matter in controversy. . . between. . . citizens of different States" means each defendant must be from a state different from
that of each plaintiff, and given that equation, the words simply will
not sustain an interpretation that permits a plaintiff to assert a belated
40
claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant.
In light of the elasticity that the words of the diversity statute have
shown in other contexts, 141 one would expect such rigid construction to
be supported by at least a few pointed sentences uttered in the course of
the reenactment. Once again, however, the committee reports, 142 floor
debate, 143 and hearings 144 contain not even a reference to ancillary jurisdiction, much less this small comer of it. Nor is it fair to presume
that because Congress modified other parts of section 1332 (jurisdictional amount and corporate citizenship) in order to reduce significantly the federal caseload 145 it also indicated which way it wanted the
wind to blow on ancillary jurisdiction questions. It is not the business
of Congress to regulate by unspoken intention, at least not according to
the enactment procedure set out in article I, section 7 of the Constitution. 4 6 We must suppose that there were reasons why Congress did
not address the issue, and they are not difficult to imagine: the sticky
politics of tinkering with diversity jurisdiction, drafting difficulties, or,
even more likely, a failure even to consider the issue.
Let us suppose, though, that there is evidence to support the presumption that when Congress reuttered those magic words "matter in
139. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
140. See 437 U.S. at 373.
141. See notes 119-29 supra & accompanying text.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S.REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), reprintedin [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099.
143. 104 CONG. REC. 12683-90 (1958).
144. Jurisdiction of FederalCourts ConcerningDiversity of Citizenship: Hearingson HR 2516
andH 4497Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., IstSess.
(1957).
145. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts calculated that, based on cases
filed in district courts during the second quarter of the fiscal year 1957, raising the jurisdictional
amount to $10,000 would have reduced the diversity jurisdiction contract caseload by 38.2% and
the tort caseload by some 15.5%. It also found that making corporations citizens of states where
they had their principal places of business would have reduced the diversity jurisdiction corporate
caseload by 3.6% in the southern district of Texas and 23.5% in the western district of Michigan.
Diversity cases constituted more than one-third of the total civil cases filed in the district courts
during 1955 and 1956. Of all civil cases in 1956, 23% were diversity cases filed by nonresident
corporations doing business in the state of suit. H. REP. No. 1706, supra note 142, at 11-12.
146. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. See Radin, 4 Case Study in Statutory Interpretation:Western
Union Co. vs. Lenroot, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 219, 223 (1945).
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controversy . . between . . . citizens of different States," it at least
was simultaneously thinking, "This means complete diversity." Would
that intention preclude all possibility of subsequent judicial interpolation? I suggest that it would not. Consider the question presented to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Welosky. 14 7 A state law enacted before the nineteenth amendment to the
Federal Constitution provided that a "person qualified to vote for rep' 48
resentatives to the general court shall be liable to serve as a juror."'
After the nineteenth amendment's adoption did this law subject women
to jury duty?' 49 To say that it did not because the legislature that
passed the law obviously had only men in mind (only men could vote
at the time) is to make the mistake that Lon Fuller called the "pointer
theory of meaning."' 1 0 It is to suppose that the phrase was meant to
designate something in particular rather than a general idea, such as
the appropriate intelligence and discretion demanded of electors.
It seems to me that something like that took place in Kroger.
Since the last reenactment of section 1332, two Supreme Court decisions have clarified the constitutional restraints on diversity jurisdiction. First, the Court has made clear that the Constitution does not
demand complete diversity even between original plaintiffs and original defendants as long as at least two adverse parties are not cocitSecond, the Court has reset the constitutional limits on
izens. 1
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, but at a point corresponding to the
"transaction or occurrence" test employed in the Federal Rules. 152 In
light of these developments, it might be that the only real obstacles to
ancillary jurisdiction over claims like Kroger's-those that were
thought to be constitutionally based-have been removed. It is still
possible to assign a meaningful general interpretation to "complete diversity" since there remain independent justifications for forbidding
plaintiffs to join nondiverse parties as an original matter-for instance,
that state courts will find it harder to discriminate in favor of their own
residents. There is no reason to suppose, however, that when it thought
"complete diversity" (if that was what it was thinking) Congress had in
mind cases X (oinder of original defendants), Y (plaintiffs' claims
against third-party defendants), and Z (plaintiffs' cross-claims). Con147. 276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931).
148. Id. at 401, 177 N.E. at 658.
149. The court, alas, thought that it did not. Id. at 406, 177 N.E. at 660. I have adopted the
more sensible analysis of the case put forth in R. DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 127-30.
150. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84 (1969).
151. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
152. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966).
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gress most likely had a more general objective, such as forcing into the
state courts plaintiffs who have nothing to fear there, to the extent required by the Constitution and consistent with judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties.
B.

The Policy of the Statute

In the concluding paragraph of its opinion the Court appears to
suggest that an independent reason for denying jurisdiction over Kroger's claim against Owen is that "[t]he policy of the statute calls for its
strict construction."' 5 3 If "policy" is something the Court has free rein
in improvising from the text of the law, then part II of this Article indicates that the result should have been otherwise. What Justice Stewart
seems to mean, however, is that the majority was constrained to reach
its conclusion despite "the convenience of litigants [and] considerations
of judicial economy" because "policy" was part of "the congressional
command."'1 4 In that case the term must stand for the larger objectives
Congress hoped to achieve through the provision for and limitations on
diversity jurisdiction.
This is not the place to reopen the debate on that question, but
neither is it necessary to do so for our purposes. Concluding that the
general objectives of Congress require limiting diversity jurisdiction
whenever possible is no more helpful than saying that Congress
adopted the rule of complete diversity. When a grant of jurisdiction
serves judicial economy and fairness and convenience for the parties
we ought to have a more particular statement of intent before attributing to the legislature such a procrustean position. If, as has been
shown, Congress has said nothing about the occasions for ancillary jurisdiction, it is hard to see what else will suffice. Certainly the Court's
policy statements are insufficient. One of those-a suggestion that
Congress wanted to observe the demands of article III in requiring
complete diversity' 5 5 -has just been disposed of. A second-reducing
the burden of diversity litigation in the federal courts to make room for
"distinctive federal business" 5 6 --was dealt with in part II. The notion
was advanced there that a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant was an odd place for the Court to make a stand on that issue.
The same might be said for Congress, although of course we have no
153.
154.
155.
156.

437 U.S. at 377 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
Id. at 377-78.
Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941).
Id.
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evidence that it intended the policy to apply to such a case.' 5 7
The final policy the Court adverted to was avoiding offense to
states' sensitivities by preserving for them cases not clearly withdrawn
by congressional action.'5 8 Given the collateral estoppel effect that a
federal decision on the original claim is likely to have in many cases, 59
however, it is not clear that the states are left with a great deal of independence anyway. In fact, the states might appreciate rather than resent having the federal courts tidy up the loose ends of their own cases.

157. Nor was Indianapolisv. Chase NationalBank a convincing analogy, since it was a nondiverse plaintiff's attempt to acquire jurisdiction as an original matter by misalignment-or that at
least is what a majority of the Court concluded.
158. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63,
76-77 (1941); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934). Cf. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,446
(1942) (policy of statute giving diversity jurisdiction to district courts requires strict construction of

statute).
159. See note 44 supra & accompanying text.
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